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Abstract 
The objective of this work is to study the effect of institutional quality on labour 
productivity in sub-Saharan Africa. To do this, we considered a panel of 31 countries over the 
period from 1996 to 2016. Thus, we constructed an empirical model based on the stochastic 
frontier production function developed by Battese and Coelli (1995), to which we applied 
panel estimation techniques (static and dynamic), particularly with GMM system and Within 
estimators. Our results show that institutional quality indicators have a positive and significant 
influence on labour productivity. Political stability, government effectiveness and the rule of 
law are the indicators that contribute most to increasing labour productivity in sub-Saharan 
Africa. A series of robustness tests were performed to confirm our results. Thus, we suggest 
that African governments take a closer look at policies that promote good governance in their 
labour productivity growth strategies to improve the competitiveness of their economies. 
Keywords: Institutional quality, Labour productivity, GMM system, Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
1. Introduction 
According to recent literature on economic growth, investment and capital accumulation 
alone cannot explain economic growth, but much more by productivity growth (Hall & Jones, 
1999; Easterly & Levine, 2001; Caselli, 2005). For Krugman, productivity is not everything, 
but in the long run, productivity becomes almost everything (Krugman, 1997). He states that 
without it there will be no long-term economic growth. Thus, several studies have focused on 
the factors that explain productivity growth. Many authors highlight the importance of the 
quality of institutions. For example, Hall and Jones (1999) explain that observed productivity 
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differences between countries are related to differences in institutions and government 
policies; what they refer to as "social infrastructure". Thus, for example, countries with more 
secure property rights tend to have higher productivity and therefore higher per capita income 
levels (North, 1991). Olson et al (2000) empirically show that the quality of governance3 
significantly improves productivity growth in fast-growing developing countries. Rigobon 
and Rodrik (2005) argue that when political and economic institutions strengthen and foster 
each other, they contribute positively to productivity and growth. 
In particular, some empirical studies have focused on the impact of institutional 
quality on labour productivity (measured by output per worker). For example, Mustafa and 
Jamil (2018) conducted a study of 12 Asian countries and found that government efficiency 
and regulatory quality were positively related to average labour productivity. Over a sample 
of 22 OECD countries, Salinas-Jiménez and Salinas-Jiménez (2007) showed that, different 
indicators of corruption are negatively related to labour productivity. Jankauskas and 
Šeputienė (2007) on the other hand, analyses data from 23 European countries and finds that 
several governance indicators are positively and significantly related to labour productivity. 
To our knowledge, there is no empirical study that has focused on the specific case of 
sub-Saharan African countries4. The region has the lowest labour productivity according to a 
World Bank report (2018)5. At the same time, sub-Saharan Africa has relatively poor 
governance performance (Global Competitiveness Index, 2018)6.  
The following table presents the classification of the last 10 countries in the region with low 
labour productivity with their respective average global governance indices over the period 
1996-2016. It reveals that all the poor performing countries in governance, have low labour 
productivity. 
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Table 1: Classification of the last 10 low labour productivity countries (1996-2016 
average) 
The last 10 countries with low 
average labour productivity 
Average labour productivity 
( constant 2011 PPP $) Average governance indices 
Sierra Leone 
Togo 
Malawi 
Rwanda 
Mozambique 
Liberia 
Central African Republic  
Niger 
Burundi 
DRC 
3423.66 
2816.79 
2414.98 
2337.81 
2277.41 
2244.66 
2095.98 
2060.02 
1775.43 
1619.23 
-0.86 
-0.87 
-0.36 
-0.58 
-0.39 
-1.12 
-1.35 
-0.63 
-1.25 
-1.66 
Source : les auteurs à partir des données de WDI(2018) et WGI(2018) 
The emphasis on labour productivity in this work is explained within the context of 
sub-Saharan Africa, by the fact that a very large proportion of the active population is found 
in agriculture and the informal service sector where productivity and income are low and 
there is a high degree of vulnerability to work (Szirmai, Gebreeyesus, Guadagno, & 
Verspagen, 2013). The region has the highest vulnerable employment rate in the world, at 
around 66% (ILO, 2018). Mckinsey (2012) estimates that the African continent must create 
122 million jobs in 2020, with demographics implying that by 2035, the number of people 
seeking employment on the continent will exceed that of China or India. However, Bhalla 
(2007) notes that job creation alone is insufficient. More specifically, it believes that most of 
the poor in developing countries are employed, but despite this, they remain poor. She stresses 
that, in order to reduce poverty, to achieve a certain degree of inclusiveness, it is necessary to 
improve the productivity of existing jobs (with a view to making them more productive) and 
to create new productive jobs. 
The main objective of this study is to measure the effect of institutional quality on 
productivity growth. Specifically its endeavours to identify the institutional quality indicators 
that contribute most to increasing labour productivity7 in sub-Saharan Africa. To do this, we 
chose to study the case of a sample composed of 31 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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The rest of the work is organized as follows: in section 2 we will review the literature on the 
relationship between institutional quality and labour productivity. Section 3 will describe the 
methodology used in this work. The presentation of the model, data and sources, and 
estimation techniques will be discussed. In section 4, we will interpret the results obtained. 
We will conclude with the conclusion in section 5. 
2. Institutional Quality and Labour Productivity: what the literature teaches us 
From the 1990s, considerable attention has been paid to the role of institutional quality 
in explaining differences in output per worker8 (or average labour productivity). Thus, it has 
been discussed to explain not only the differences in productivity between countries but also 
why some countries invest more in human and physical capital (North 1990, Knack & Keefer 
1995; Acemoglu et al, 2001, Easterly & Levine 2002, Hall & Jones 1999). Thus, Hall and 
Jones (1999) explain that differences in productivity and therefore in output per worker are 
fundamentally linked to differences in social infrastructure, i.e. the institutions and 
government policies that determine the economic environment in which individuals 
accumulate skills, and firms accumulate capital and produce goods. Institutions are the "rules 
of the game" that guide and shape human interactions (Coase, 1998; North, 1991, Williamson, 
1987). They can be formal - including laws, regulations, property rights - or informal rules, 
such as norms, habits and practices, social conventions. Together, they form the basis of the 
incentive structure for economic agents, reduce transaction costs, making markets more 
efficient, and thus promoting labour productivity. For Islam (2008), Lio and Liu (2008), the 
institutional environment should be considered as an important factor of productivity. Del Rio 
(2018) explains that more accountable and equitable governance encourages the accumulation 
of social infrastructure by government, which promotes productivity (TFP and labour 
productivity). 
Thus, in his study, Dawson (1998) argues that economic freedom9 directly influences 
growth through total factor productivity and indirectly through investment. Klein and Luu 
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freedom itself (Index of freedom economic, 2019). 
 
5 
 
(2003) use a stochastic border model to examine the relationship between economic freedom, 
policies10 that, promote political stability, economic performance, and find that economic 
freedom and policy stability contribute to economic efficiency and labour productivity. His 
study covers a sample of 39 countries between 1975 and 1990; and find that economic 
freedom and stabilization policies have a positive and significant impact on labour 
productivity. Similarly, Adkins, Moomaw and Savvides (2002), show that increasing 
economic freedom leads to increased efficiency and therefore to growth in total factor 
productivity. Increased economic freedom, according to Zhang, Hall, and Yao (2018) can 
reduce the transaction costs of productive activities, make foreign capital more accessible and 
national capital more productive, and improve educational performance, all of which 
stimulate productivity. Meon and Weill (2005) analyse the effect of governance on technical 
efficiency for a sample of 62 countries. Their results reveal that Kaufmann's six governance 
indicators have a negative impact on technical inefficiency and thus improve labour 
productivity. The authors go further and show that government efficiency is the indicator that 
has the greatest impact on labour productivity. Mustafa and Jamil (2018), on the other hand, 
find that government efficiency and the quality of regulation have a positive and significant 
impact on labour productivity. 
Hall and Jones (1999), after analysing 127 countries, argue that institutional 
differences are the main cause of differences in productivity and GDP per capita between 
these countries. By tracing the influence of institutions on the influence of colonies or 
colonization in Western Europe and their adaptation to social infrastructure. They find that 
institutions promote productivity and growth. Cavalcanti et al (2005) submits similar 
estimates to Hall and Jones (1999). The authors find that a 1% increase in institutional 
variables is associated with a 5% increase in GDP per worker in 1988 in an analysis of cross-
sectional data. Doyle and Doyle, Martínez-Zarzoso (2007) in a study on the relationship 
between productivity, trade and institutional quality for a panel of countries over the period 
1980-2000, adduce to results that indicate that institutional quality measurement, as well as 
openness, area and three of the dummies related to the continent, are determinants of labour 
productivity. Del Rio (2018) develops a neoclassical growth model in which the government 
accumulates social infrastructure, which promotes productivity. In its calibrated model, for a 
country in the bottom decile of the social infrastructure index distribution, improving 
governance equity by one point of its standard deviation increases social infrastructure by an 
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average of 84% and GDP per worker by about 38%. In their study on the relationship between 
trust and productivity, Bjørnskov et Méon, (2015) found that trust has a positive effect on 
TFP. But this effect is indirect and passes through the economic-judicial institutions but not 
through the political institutions. 
3. Methodology 
This section elaborates the model adopted in this research work, the data and their sources, 
and the estimation techniques used to measure the effect of institutional quality on labour 
productivity in sub-Saharan Africa. 
a. The empirical model 
Our empirical model is based on a stochastic production frontier model, initially 
developed independently by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van Den 
Broeck (1977). Battese and Coelli (1995) propose an extension of the original version of the 
previous authors. Its model11 is as follows:      (     )    (       )                                                                                                        ( ) 
Where Yit represents the production of firm i (i=1... N) at the period t (t=1,..., T), Xit represents a 
vector of production inputs associated with the i-th firm in the i-th period.   is a vector of 
unknown parameters to be estimated. The Vit are the random errors of distribution N (0,   ); the    , independent of random errors, follow a distribution truncated to zero with average          and variance    . The     are specified by the following function:             with       represent all the variables associated with the technical inefficiency of production units12 
is a vector of unknown parameters and Wit is a residual term. Technical efficiency is 
measured by the ratio of production observed to optimal production. The closer this ratio is to 
1, the closer the observed production is to optimal production, which reflects high labour 
productivity (Y/L). "The new institutional economics suggests that countries with high levels 
of economic freedom (protection of private property rights, respect for the rule of the law, an 
unhampered price system, and so on) and policy stability (commitment not to change the 
rules of the game ex-post) will be closer to the best-practice frontier" (Klein & Luu, 2003: 
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434). According to Méon and Weill (2005), technical inefficiency is explained by poor 
governance. Low quality institutions result in lower technical efficiency, and therefore lower 
productivity. We can therefore write:      (            )13 where           is a (   ) 
vector of institutional quality indicators. Then consider the Cobb Douglass production 
function14 with constant returns to scale. We can therefore derived from this function our 
empirical model as follows:   (  )⁄           (  )⁄         (  )⁄                                                          ( ) 
where (  )⁄  , (  )⁄   and (  )⁄  are respectively output per worker, physical capital per 
worker and human capital per worker.           represents the vector of the six Kaufmann 
institution quality indicators that are widely used in studies on institution quality (these are: 
government effectiveness (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), political stability and absence of 
violence (PSAV), voice and accountability (VA), rule of law (RL) and corruption control 
(CC)).  
b. Data and sources 
 
This study uses non-cylindrical panel data from 31 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. It 
covers the period 1996-2016. The choice of this period is dictated by the availability of data. 
The data are mainly from the World Development Indicators (2018), World Governance 
Indicators (2018), Barro and Lee (2013) and La Porta (1999) (see Table 2 in the Appendix for 
the definition of variables and their sources). A descriptive analysis of the different variables 
in this work is presented in Table 3 in the appendices. 
c. The estimation technique 
This study tries attempting to apply two panel estimation techniques (static and dynamic) to 
estimate the effect of institutional quality indicators on labour productivity in sub-Saharan 
African countries over the period 1996-2016. The static panel estimation technique will focus 
on the within model while the dynamic panel estimation method will focus on system GMM 
(Generalized Moments Method System). This process will be carried out using the 
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econometric software STATA 14. The choice of these two estimation techniques (Within and 
GMM-system) allows us, on one hand, to identify the problem of bias and efficiency of 
estimators and, on the other hand, to strengthen the robustness of our results. 
4. Effect of institutional quality on labour productivity in sub-Saharan Africa 
Before arriving at the results of the estimates, we make a cross-analysis of the 
evolution of labour productivity and the indicators of the quality of institutions. Graph 1 
below shows the crossed-evolution of institutional quality indicators and labour productivity 
indicators. Its analysis shows a strong correlation between the six indicators and labour 
productivity, reflecting a relationship between the two variables. Indeed, maintaining, for 
example, the rule of law, which refers to "the extent to which agents have confidence in the 
rules of society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts, 
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence" (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2006: 4) 
would contribute to protecting citizens against theft, expropriation by the government and 
repudiation of contracts and guarantee property rights which, in effect, reduce transaction 
costs. This would make markets more efficient and promote productivity. However, this graph 
does not take into account other potential factors that may affect labour productivity. 
Moreover, the correlation between two variables does not provide information on the cause-
and-effect relationship. Thus, we turn to regression models. 
With regard to regression results, those with the within model are presented in Table 5. 
In order to avoid the problem of multicollinearity associated with the six indicators of 
institutional quality, because of the strong correlation between these six indicators (see Table 
4), we have introduced the six indicators into regression models in an alternative way. The 
results reveal, in accordance with the literature, that both human and physical capital per 
worker have a positive and significant impact on labour productivity. Similarly, indicators of 
the quality of institutions positively affect labour productivity, but their signs are not 
significant. According to North (1991), countries with better institutions, more secure 
property rights and less distorting policies will invest more in physical and human capital and 
use these factors more effectively to achieve higher income levels. Using data from 1984-
2008 for a total of 71 developed and developing countries, Ahmad, Ullah and Arfeen (2012) 
find that the capital stock per worker has a positive and statistically significant effect on GDP 
per worker. Similarly, human capital, which they measure by the secondary school enrolment 
rate, has a positive and significant impact on GDP per worker. 
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Source: Authors based on World Bank data (2018) 
 
Graph 1: Crossed-evolution of governance and labour productivity indicators (1996-2016 average) 
The insignificance of institutional quality indicators may be related to the estimation method 
used here (the within estimator, although adapted for panel data, does not take into account 
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endogeneity bias). Indeed, indicators of the quality of institutions can be subject to problems 
of endogeneity15.  
Table 4: Correlation between the six governance indicators 
 
GE CC PSAV RQ RL VA 
       
GE 1 
     
CC 0.87 1 
    
PSAV 0.72 0.70 1 
   
RQ 0.90 0.81 0.70 1 
  
RL 0.90 0.87 0.80 0.90 1 
 
VA 0.76 0.70 0.68 0.75 0.81 1 
Source: Authors based on WGI data (2018) 
 
The sources of endogeneity are mainly of three kinds: measurement error, dual or inverse 
causality and the existence of omitted variables. In the first case, as Acemoglu et al (2001) 
point out, institutional variables are derived from expert opinions and survey data, and are 
therefore potentially subject to systematic measurement errors. For example, this could 
happen if experts tend to observe better institutions in countries with high labour productivity 
growth. The second is the reverse causality: indeed, high-income countries with higher levels 
of productivity seem to have better institutions (Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004). Klein 
and Luu (2003) argue that economic freedom and policy constraints remain determinants of 
productivity, but the relationship can go the other way. They affirm that the most productive 
countries are richer and that rich countries can put in place stable "laissez-faire" policies. 
Similarly, Farhadi, Islam and Moslehi (2015) believe that countries with higher productivity 
growth can have greater economic freedom. In the third case, it should be noted that several 
variables (which are not necessarily taken into account in our model because of the forgotten 
or lack of data), according to the literature, influence labour productivity. Also, the empirical 
literature emphasizes the dynamic dimension16 in the process of labour productivity growth. 
In order to correct these problems, we propose the GMM estimation technique (Generalized 
Moment Method Estimation)17. 
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 Endogeneity is a situation where an explanatory variable is correlated with the error term 
16
 The dynamic dimension involves integrating the delayed dependent variable among the explanatory variables 
in the model; since the dependent variable is correlated with the error term, so is its delayed value; this also 
raises an endogeneity problem; in this case the estimate within is no longer appropriate. 
17
 This method suits the structure of our data (a non-cylindrical panel with T=21 < N=31) 
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Table 5: Results of the estimates with the within model (fixed effects) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
H/L 0.0817** (2.328) 
0.0825** 
(2.144) 
0.0822** 
(2.174) 
0.0843** 
(2.494) 
0.0803** 
(2.194) 
0.0835** 
(2.333) 
0.0839** 
(2.355) 
LnK/L 0.139*** (3.395) 
0.136*** 
(3.276) 
0.133*** 
(3.040) 
0.130*** 
(3.086) 
0.127*** 
(2.950) 
0.123** 
(2.668) 
0.126*** 
(2.756) 
GE 0.0774 (0.945)       
      
CC  0.0339 (0.421)      
      
PSAV   0.0257 (0.813)     
      
RQ    0.0912 (1.186)    
      
RL     0.119 (1.602)   
      
VA      0.0941 (1.369)  
      
GG       0.120 (1.236) 
      
Constant 7.839*** (36.30) 
7.819*** 
(38.02) 
7.828*** 
(36.34) 
7.871*** 
(36.06) 
7.927*** 
(35.80) 
7.908*** 
(31.51) 
7.914*** 
(33.01) 
Observations 511 511 511 511 511 511 511 
R-squared 0.389 0.380 0.383 0.395 0.403 0.394 0.397 
Number of id 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
F-test: 
Prob (F) 
10.88 
0.000 
9.045 
0.000 
9.433 
0.000 
11.08 
0.000 
10.87 
0.000 
12.70 
0.000 
11.56 
0.000 
Note: The values in parentheses represent absolute t-statistics; ***, **,* mean significantly to 1% respectively; 
5% ; 10%. 
Sources: Authors 
 
This method has the advantage of providing not only efficient and unbiased 
estimators, but also resolving the issue of heteroscedasticity of residues. It was originally 
developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991). There 
are two types of GMM estimators: the GMM difference estimator and the GMM system 
estimator. The first estimation method (the GMM difference estimator) is advantageous 
compared to other dynamic model estimation methods on panel data because it eliminates the 
biases generated by the omission of certain explanatory variables and also allows, through the 
use of instrumental variables (i.e. level variables used as instruments), to estimate the 
parameters more accurately. According to Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001), the use of 
instrumental variables also leads to better results, even in the case of measurement errors. 
However, the GMM difference estimator has some shortcomings. For this reason, Blundell 
12 
 
and Bond (1998), in their Monte Carlo simulations, proposed the GMM system estimator, 
which consists of combining for each period the equations in first differences with the level 
equations in which the variables are instrumented by their first differences. The resulting 
equation system is estimated simultaneously using the generalized moment method. In 
addition, the two authors in 2000 show that when the explanatory variables and the dependent 
variable are highly persistent, the instruments used for the GMM difference estimator are 
small and this estimator is not relevant. According to them, the GMM system estimator is 
therefore the most appropriate. However, the latter generally uses more instruments, which 
may make it inappropriate. Hansen's test of over-identification of restrictions, proposed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995), is applied here to verify the overall validity of the instruments. 
But this test loses its relevance if the number of instruments is too high. This problem can be 
solved by ensuring that the ratio r measured by the ratio between the number of countries i 
and the number of instruments iv (     ⁄ ) is greater than or equal to 1 (Roodman, 2009). 
Thus, when r < 1, the assumptions underlying the estimation procedure may be violated. In 
addition, a low r increases the susceptibility of estimates to a standard deviation of 1, i.e. it 
produces significant results even if there is no underlying relationship between the variables 
involved (Roodman, 2009). 
As mentioned above, the literature suggests that the past level of labour productivity 
may affect its current value (Salinas-Jiménez and Salinas-Jiménez, 2007). Thus, in order to 
integrate this dynamic dimension into our empirical model (2), we reformulate a working 
model taking into account the initial level of labour productivity (Barro, 1991). 
  (  )⁄           (  )         (  )⁄         (  )⁄                                   ( ) 
Where (Y/L)it-1 represents the value of labour productivity in the past period, the other 
variables are defined as before. 
The results of the estimates of the new model with the GMM in system are listed in 
Table 6. They reveal that the six indicators of institutional quality have positive and 
statistically significant effects on labour productivity. The most significant indicators are: 
Political stability and the absence of violence and the quality of regulation. An increase in the 
standard deviation of government effectiveness, control of corruption, political stability and 
absence of violence, quality of regulation, rule of law and voice and one point responsibility 
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leads to an increase in labour productivity of 4.551%; 3.99%; 6.11%; 4.15%; 5.32%; 3.66%18 
respectively. The indicators that have the greatest impact on labour productivity are therefore 
political stability and absence of violence, the rule of law and government effectiveness. Then 
we have the quality of regulation, the control of corruption and finally voice and 
responsibility. 
Regarding political stability, Carmignani (2003) argues that political instability 
generates uncertainty and that the latter, in turn, affects the incentives for private agents and 
companies to invest and accumulate factors. Uncertainty also affects the motivations of 
policymakers, who may be tempted to implement "myopic" policies19 to increase their 
survival in office, broaden their electoral consensus or tie the hands of their potential 
successor. All this has the effect of reducing production inefficiency, and thus reducing labour 
productivity. Klein and Luu (2003), working on 39 countries over the period 1975-1990, find 
that policies that promote political stability have a positive and significant impact on output 
per worker. Repkine (2014), out of a sample of 48 African countries from 1996 to 2010, 
shows that ethnic minorities, when given access to education, would promote greater political 
stability and therefore greater productive efficiency. 
With regard to government effectiveness, it refers to "the quality of public services, 
the quality of the public service and its degree of independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of government 
commitment" (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2006: 4). It would reduce transaction costs 
by improving the provision of public services and thus promote productivity. Mustafa and 
Jamil (2018) also find that government efficiency positively and significantly affects labour 
productivity. With regard to the rule of law, Méon and Weill (2005) explain that weak rule of 
law can lead to widespread theft that will force agents to invest in protecting their assets 
rather than in productive activities, thereby reducing productive efficiency. 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 These values are obtained by multiplying the respective coefficients of the six institutional quality indicators 
by the standard deviations of the latter 
19
 By myopic policies, the author refers to the increase in the taxation of capital for redistribution purposes, the 
increase in public consumption for compensation purposes, the reduction of investment in the judicial system, 
the delay (or reversal) of structural reforms and the return on previous commitments. 
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Table 6: Results of estimates with GMM system 
VARIABLES (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
LnGDPPW(-1)20 0.856*** (0.0438) 
0.911*** 
(0.0309) 
0.910*** 
(0.0351) 
0.879*** 
(0.0335) 
0.861*** 
(0.0562) 
0.925*** 
(0.0319) 
0.860*** 
(0.0295) 
H/L 0.00107 (0.0143) 
0.00548 
(0.00928) 
0.00486 
(0.0118) 
0.0131 
(0.0112) 
0.0211 
(0.0155) 
0.0125 
(0.0131) 
0.00420 
(0.00931) 
LnK/L 0.0755** (0.0282) 
0.0362* 
(0.0208) 
0.0352* 
(0.0179) 
0.0429* 
(0.0232) 
0.0188 
(0.0388) 
0.0138 
(0.0183) 
0.0685*** 
(0.0166) 
GE 0.0740* (0.0407)       
      
CC  0.0679* (0.0381)      
      
PSAV   0.0627*** (0.0185)     
      
RQ    0.0672** (0.0260)    
      
RL     0.0825* (0.0442)   
      
VA      0.0514* (0.0297)  
      
GG       0.0867** (0.0377) 
      
Constant 0.958*** (0.286) 
0.638*** 
(0.198) 
0.647** 
(0.251) 
0.838*** 
(0.210) 
1.100** 
(0.412) 
0.578** 
(0.218) 
0.937*** 
(0.192) 
Observations 488 488 488 488 488 488 488 
Nber of id 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
No instruments 19 21 25 23 23 26 20 
AR1 p-value 0.0234 0.0244 0.0298 0.0258 0.0198 0.0247 0.0248 
AR2 p-value 0.961 0.241 0.986 0.211 0.340 0.429 0.863 
Hansen p-value 0.496 0.869 0.674 0.499 0.409 0.418 0.593 
Note: The values in parentheses represent absolute t-statistics; ***, **,* mean significantly to 1% respectively; 
5% ; 10%. 
Sources: Authors 
 
Similarly, for regulatory quality, which measures the ability of governments to design 
and implement good policies and regulations that support private sector development 
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2006: 4), can be equated with economic freedom. Klein 
                                                          
20
 The estimator of the dynamic panel model by the command xtabond2 with Stata gives the value   of the 
coefficient of the delayed variable. But it is necessary to calculate the value of the coefficient of this variable 
which is ( -1) in the growth model as well as its absolute t-statistics which is (   )                        (Kpodar, 
2007). The results (which can be obtained on request) give a negative and significant sign of   reflecting the 
process of labour productivity convergence in sub-Saharan Africa. The other signs remain unchanged. 
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and Luu (2003) show that economic freedom has a positive and significant impact on output 
per worker. 
Regarding the control of corruption, according to Bjørnskov and Méon (2010), 
problems, such as corruption, can encourage the diversion of resources from productive 
activities to rent-seeking and dishonest practices, thus reducing productive efficiency. Ahmad 
et al (2012) find that the ICRG (International Country Risk Guide) corruption index 
positively and significantly affects GDP per worker, while its quadratic term has a negative 
effect on GDP per worker. 
Finally, the voice and responsibility indicator, which measures how a country's 
citizens participate in the selection of their leaders, as well as freedom of expression, 
association and the press (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2006: 4), seems to be the 
indicator that has the least impact on labour productivity. Méon and Weill (2005) also 
propose the same results for a group of 62 countries. On the other hand, human capital per 
worker remains positive but is no longer significant according to Méon and Weill (2005). 
We continue with the analysis of the robustness of our results by using external 
instruments. One of the advantages of GMM is that it allows the use of external instruments, 
i.e. variables that serve as instruments to correct endogeneity but are not included in the 
model (Farhadi and al, 2015). Following La Porta et al (1999), we have chosen three 
instruments: ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF), latitude and a dummy variable reflecting 
the country's legal origin (it takes the value 1 if the country's legal origin is French and 0 
otherwise). The latitude represents the areas of residence of Europeans during the colonial 
period. Due to their lack of immunity to tropical diseases, they were more likely to reside in 
more temperate latitudes, which is therefore linked to the creation of economic institutions. 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization reflects the extent of political differences in society between 
social, ethnic, class or other interests. It measures the probability that two people chosen at 
random in a country belong to different ethnic or linguistic groups. These three variables have 
already been used by Boschini, Pettersson and Roine (2013) and Farhadi and al, (2015) as 
potential instruments of institutional quality in their estimates of cross-sectional and panel 
data. 
The results are presented in columns 15, 16, 17, 18, 18, 19, 20, 21 of Table 7. They are 
consistent with the previous results in Table 6. In addition, they reveal an improvement in the 
significance of the coefficients of the institutional quality indicators. The most important 
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indicators of institutional quality are political stability (5.32%) and the rule of law (5.48%)21. 
On the other hand, the capital stock per worker, while keeping its positive sign, is no longer 
significant. This indicates the importance of the effect of institutional quality on labour 
productivity. Hall and Jones (1999) find that disparities in physical and human capital only 
partially explain differences in output per worker, much of which is due to differences in 
Solow residuals that are fundamentally explained by differences in social infrastructure. The 
authors also use several instruments (including our three instruments) in their regressions. 
Still with a view to analysing the robustness of our results, we examine the sensitivity 
of our baseline results with GMM system (see Table 6) following the addition of new control 
variables based on the literature on labour productivity. It is about: 
The quality of infrastructure captured by the number of fixed telephone subscriptions (per 
100 inhabitants): access to telephone, electricity and paved roads offers individuals a better 
choice and can lead to a higher standard of living. A quality infrastructure ensures the 
reduction of transaction costs and thus promotes productivity. The expected sign is positive. 
Urbanization captured by the urban population (% of the total): Jayasuriya and Wodon (2005) 
believe that cities are developing, with the presence of universities, research centres and many 
companies, through learning and innovation, thus facilitating spill over effects. Similarly, for 
Mills, Epple and Oates (2000), cities provide economies of scale, encourage division of 
labour and provide a better environment for adapting skills to needs. They therefore promote 
productive efficiency and increase productivity. His expected sign is positive. 
Trade openness is measured by the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP: a 
country's trade openness allows the diffusion of knowledge in the economy encourages 
competition and promotes economic growth (Dollar & Kraay, 2004). Similarly, Edwards 
(1998) finds that openness can be significantly and positively linked to productivity and 
productivity growth. The expected sign is therefore positive. 
The employment rate measured by the employment to population ratio: the employment rate 
can reduce labour productivity by bringing low-skilled workers into the labour market. Artus 
and Cette, (2004) explain that the slowdown in labour productivity in European countries is 
often linked to the increase in the employment rate induced by proactive labour market 
policies. Its expected sign is therefore negative. 
                                                          
21
 These values are obtained by multiplying the respective coefficients of the six institutional quality indicators 
by the standard deviations of the latter 
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Table 7: Results of the estimates with GMM system (Use of external instruments) 
VARIABLES (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
LnGDPPW(-1) 0.914*** (0.0363) 
0.950*** 
(0.0281) 
0.925*** 
(0.0459) 
0.947*** 
(0.0402) 
0.907*** 
(0.0579) 
0.934*** 
(0.0420) 
0.923*** 
(0.0365) 
H/L 0.00377 (0.00472) 
0.00841* 
(0.00446) 
0.0134* 
(0.00786) 
0.00816* 
(0.00475) 
0.0111 
(0.0117) 
0.0125* 
(0.00625) 
0.00761** 
(0.00369) 
LnK/L 0.0320 (0.0218) 
0.00187 
(0.0286) 
0.00117 
(0.0293) 
0.00578 
(0.0325) 
0.0122 
(0.0481) 
0.000641 
(0.0295) 
0.0218 
(0.0264) 
GE 0.0530** (0.0211)       
      
CC  0.0491** (0.0200)      
      
PSAV   0.0585*** (0.0181)     
      
RQ    0.0561** (0.0216)    
      
RL     0.0850* (0.0440)   
      
VA      0.0603** (0.0292)  
      
GG       0.0485** (0.0225) 
      
Constant 0.634*** (0.227) 
0.441** 
(0.161) 
0.643** 
(0.288) 
0.445* 
(0.220) 
0.777* 
(0.382) 
0.571** 
(0.250) 
0.579*** 
(0.209) 
Observations 488 488 488 488 488 488 488 
Nbre de pays 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Nbre 
d’instruments 22 24 28 26 26 29 23 
AR1 p-value 0.0265 0.0272 0.0327 0.0285 0.0219 0.0265 0.0270 
AR2 p-value 0.491 0.155 0.553 0.138 0.359 0.404 0.332 
Hansen p-value 0.730 0.476 0.654 0.544 0.590 0.439 0.598 
Note: The values in parentheses represent absolute t-statistics; ***, **,* mean significantly to 1% respectively; 
5% ; 10%. 
Sources: Authors 
 
In line with the previous results, all indicators of institutional quality are positive and 
significant except for corruption control (see Table 8). The quality indicators of institutions 
that have the greatest impact are political stability (5.06%), government effectiveness 
(5.03%), voice and accountability (5.28%) and the rule of law (4.58%)22.  
 
 
                                                          
22
 These values are obtained by multiplying the respective coefficients of the six institutional quality indicators 
by the standard deviations of the latter 
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Table 8: Results of the estimates with GMM system (Additional control variables) 
VARIABLES (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) 
lnGDPPW(-1) 
  
0.872*** 
(0.0370) 
0.841*** 
(0.0508) 
0.862*** 
(0.0559) 
0.897*** 
(0.0370) 
0.864*** 
(0.0591) 
0.882*** 0.886*** 
(0.0552) (0.0459) 
H/L 
  
0.00750 
(0.00605) 
0.0231 
(0.0138) 
0.0156** 
(0.00623) 
0.00543 
(0.00658) 
0.0127 
(0.0111) 
0.00875 
(0.0119) 
0.00984 
(0.00800) 
LnK/L 
  
0.0322** 
(0.0133) 
0.00265 
(0.0300) 
0.0379** 
(0.0184) 
0.0266** 
(0.0105) 
0.0315** 
(0.0142) 
0.0314** 
(0.0144) 
0.0286* 
(0.0159) 
Ln(trade) 
  
0.00859 
(0.00747) 
0.000258 
(0.0182) 
0.00397 
(0.00573) 
0.00567 
(0.00634) 
0.0114 
(0.00746) 
0.0141 
(0.00991) 
0.00781 
(0.00625) 
Ln(Fix_tel) 
  
0.00167 
(0.0112) 
0.0182 
(0.0215) 
0.00147 
(0.0124) 
0.00423 
(0.0104) 
-0.000515 
(0.0155) 
-0.000235 
(0.0111) 
-0.00857 
(0.0127) 
Ln(Empl_Pop) 
  
-0.187** 
(0.0781) 
-0.360** 
(0.155) 
-0.230* 
(0.114) 
-0.182** 
(0.0851) 
-0.245* 
(0.121) 
-0.238* 
(0.138) 
-0.229** 
(0.0934) 
Ln(Urb_ Pop) 
  
0.0209 
(0.0246) 
0.0210 
(0.0260) 
-0.0193 
(0.0203) 
0.00813 
(0.0179) 
0.0183 
(0.0232) 
0.00211 
(0.0325) 
0.00601 
(0.0244) 
GE 
  
0.0818*** 
(0.0260) 
            
            
CC 
  
  0.0652 
(0.0616) 
          
            
PSAV 
  
    0.0557** 
(0.0218) 
        
            
RQ 
  
      0.0575** 
(0.0232) 
      
            
RL 
  
        0.0772* 
(0.0414) 
    
            
VA           0.0742** 
(0.0314) 
  
              
GG 
  
            0.0833** 
(0.0363)             
Constant 
  
1.657*** 
(0.492) 
2.736*** 
(0.956) 
1.985** 
(0.794) 
1.492** 
(0.559) 
1.939** 
(0.867) 
1.803** 
(0.870) 
1.759*** 
(0.610) 
Observations 471 471 471 471 471 471 471 
Nombre de pays 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Nbre d’instruments 29 31 28 28 29 29 25 
AR1 p-value 0.0574 0.0741 0.0735 0.0618 0.0490 0.0529 0.0615 
AR2 p-value 0.571 0.137 0.989 0.166 0.481 0.602 0.454 
Hansen p-value 0.230 0.174 0.627 0.305 0.623 0.421 0.498 
Note: The values in parentheses represent absolute t-statistics; ***, **,* mean significantly to 1% respectively; 
5% ; 10%. 
Sources: Authors 
 
19 
 
Keefer and Knack (1997) find, in their study on economic growth and convergence, that the 
coefficient of corruption becomes insignificant once other control variables are included in 
the regressions. Similarly, Ahmad et al (2012) report in their regression that the corruption 
index positively and significantly affects GDP per worker but becomes insignificant when 
control variables are introduced. On the other hand, Mauro (1995), in his study, finds a more 
significant coefficient of corruption following the addition of other control variables. 
The employment rate coefficient is negative and significant. This reflects a decreasing 
scale yield of this variable. This result is in line with that found by Belorgey (2006), which 
shows that the employment rate has a negative and significant impact on labour productivity 
and growth. Thereafter, the coefficients of the other additional control variables 
(infrastructure quality, urbanization and trade openness) are not significant. As mentioned 
above, this is explained in particular by the primacy of the effect of the quality of institutions 
over other factors that explain labour productivity. For example, several studies have not been 
able to find a significant relationship between trade openness and productivity growth. Rodrik 
et al (2004) measure the effect of the quality of institutions, geography and trade on an 
economy's growth rate, but also on its income or productivity levels. They find that the effect 
of institutional quality outweighs other effects. Moreover, the coefficient related to trade is 
negative, unlike in the literature. 
5. Conclusion  
"The central issue of economic history and economic development is to account for 
the evolution of political and economic institutions that create an economic environment that 
leads to increasing productivity" (North, 1991: 98). As part of this work, we have sought to 
study the effect of institutional quality on labour productivity in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
analysis covered a sample of 31 countries from 1996-2016 using panel estimation techniques 
(static and dynamic). Initially, the regressions focused on a static panel with the within 
estimator. In a second step, we took into account the endogeneity related to institutional 
quality indicators but also the possibility of the continuous impact of labour productivity (the 
dynamic dimension), and used the method of estimation by generalized moments in systems 
(GMM system). We found that institutional quality indicators have a positive and significant 
impact on labour productivity. Political stability is proving to be the indicator that has the 
greatest impact (both quantitatively and qualitatively) on labour productivity. This result 
remains valid after a series of robustness tests. Then we have government efficiency and the 
rule of law. 
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In view of developments in the economic literature, but also of the results obtained 
from our regressions, we can argue that the quality of institutions is important for increasing 
labour productivity in sub-Saharan Africa. Improving the quality of institutions promotes 
labour productivity growth and thus the creation of productive jobs. Zhou (2018) argues that 
strong institutions facilitate the productive employment of workers by providing an efficient 
and informative labour market that actively responds to changes in labour supply and demand 
in declining and growing sectors. In their strategies to reduce unemployment, especially for 
young people, African governments must take a closer look at policies that promote good 
governance in order to ensure political stability and the protection of property rights, thereby 
reducing uncertainty, reducing the inefficiency of market systems in order to boost 
competitiveness, and increasing the effectiveness of public policies. 
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Appendices 
Table 2: Definition and data source 
Variable Definition of variables data sources 
GE Government Effectiveness WGI (2018) 
CC Control of corruption WGI (2018) 
PSAV 
Political stability and absence of 
violence 
WGI (2018) 
RQ Regulatory quality WGI (2018) 
RL Rule of law WGI (2018) 
VA Voice and Accountability WGI (2018) 
GG 
Average governance (Arithmetic 
average of the six governance indicators) 
Authors' calculation 
GDPPW Gross domestic product per worker WDI(2018) 
H/L 
the average number of years of 
schooling for the population aged 25 and 
over 
Barro et Lee (2013) 
K/L* Capital stock per worker Authors' calculation 
Urb_Pop Urban population (%Total population) WDI(2018) 
Openness openness (%GDP) WDI(2018) 
Fix_ Tel 
Number of fixed-line telephone 
subscriptions (per 100 inhabitants) 
WDI(2018) 
Empl/Pop Employment-to-population ratio WDI(2018) 
ELF Ethno-linguistic fragmentation La Porta (1999) 
latitude Latitude La Porta (1999) 
French French legal origin La Porta (1999) 
* The capital stock was calculated using the perpetual inventory method according to Bjornskov and Meon (2015). This 
method is described in detail in Easterly and Levine (2001) 
Source: authors based on data from WDI (2018) and WGI (2018) 
 
List of countries included in our sample: 
Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania, Zimbabwe 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Ln(GDPPW) 651 80.796 10.048 60.767 110.429 
GE 558 -0.654 0.615 -10.885 10.049 
CC 558 -0.590 0.588 -10.723 10.217 
PSAV 558 -0.507 0.909 -20.845 10.200 
RQ 558 -0.560 0.618 -20.298 10.127 
RL 558 -0.617 0.645 -20.130 10.077 
VA 558 -0.518 0.712 -10.859 10.007 
GG 558 -0.574 0.616 -20.100 0.880 
H/L 651 40.277 20.056 0.800 90.430 
Ln(K/L) 586 50.008 10.468 -0.666 80.845 
Ln(Urb_Pop) 651 30.517 0.485 20.003 40.484 
Ln(trade) 639 40.188 0.518 -10.926 50.741 
Ln(Fix_Tel) 640 -0.043 10.433 -50.117 30.436 
Ln(Emp/Pop) 651 40.084 0.230 30.627 40.462 
FEL 651 0.661 0.237 0.000 0.890 
latitude 651 0.133 0.095 0.000 0.326 
french 651 0.516 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Source: authors based on data from WDI (2018) and WGI (2018) 
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Table 9: Correlation between the different variables 
                  GE CC PSAV RQ RL VA GDPPW H/L K/L trade Fix_Tel Emp/Pop Urb_Pop EFL latitude French 
                 GE 1.00 
               
CC 0.86 1.00 
              
PSAV 0.69 0.69 1.00 
             
RQ 0.91 0.81 0.68 1.00 
            
RL 0.90 0.86 0.79 0.90 1.00 
           
VA 0.76 0.69 0.67 0.76 0.81 1.00 
          
GDPPW 0.55 0.48 0.45 0.52 0.51 0.33 1.00 
         
H/L 0.48 0.37 0.32 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.64 1.00 
        
K/L 0.43 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.26 0.91 0.64 1.00 
       
trade 0.13 0.23 0.39 0.14 0.21 0.18 0.31 0.23 0.33 1.00 
      
Fix_Tel 0.66 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.63 0.46 0.73 0.52 0.64 0.28 1.00 
     
Emp/Pop -0.29 -0.30 -0.24 -0.30 -0.27 -0.17 -0.79 -0.24 -0.69 -0.25 -0.50 1.00 
    
Urb_Pop 0.16 0.15 0.34 0.16 0.16 0.22 0.57 0.44 0.55 0.35 0.35 -0.49 1.00 
   
EFL -0.07 -0.20 -0.07 -0.02 -0.10 -0.06 -0.04 0.12 -0.14 -0.17 -0.14 0.12 0.18 1.00 
  
latitude 0.55 0.63 0.50 0.44 0.54 0.54 0.34 0.12 0.29 0.22 0.60 -0.42 0.18 -0.37 1.00 
 
French -0.30 -0.28 -0.10 -0.23 -0.27 -0.18 -0.23 -0.31 -0.15 0.01 -0.31 0.29 0.05 0.06 -0.28 1.00 
Source: authors based on data from WDI (2018) and WGI (2018
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